1 Introduction

Iconicity, the direct/non-arbitrary/non-symbolic relation between meaning and form, is not usually considered by the generativist to be a prominent feature of language. Chomsky (1995, 2000) considers vocabulary (probably correctly) as a list of exceptions among which the arbitrary relation between the form and meaning of a lexical item is a very typical example. Moreover, he assumes that the faculty of language FL consists of a cognitive system that stores information (the computational system and the lexicon), and some performance systems -- the "external" systems A-P and C-I interacting with the cognitive system at two interface levels of PF and LF respectively -- responsible for using and accessing information (Chomsky,1995). He takes a particular language L to be a procedure of constructing pairs (pi, lambda) out of lexical items LIs selected from the lexicon and mapped onto a lexical array/numeration to be introduced into the derivation by the computational system. The operation Spell-Out strips away pi elements from the structure sigma to be mapped to pi by the phonological component of the computational system and leaves the residue sigma-L for its covert component to map to lambda so that they are interpreted at A-P and C-I interfaces respectively as "instructions" to the relevant performance systems. If they consist entirely of interpretable objects, i.e. those that are legible to the external systems, the derivation D converges as it satisfies the condition of Full Interpretation. 'A derivation converges at one of the interface levels if it yields a representation satisfying FI at this level, and converges if it converges at both interface levels, PF and LF; otherwise, it crashes' (1995: 219-220). In case there are more than one convergent derivation possible, the most economical one blocks all others. Given the assumption that the convergence of a derivation is conditional upon its interpretability at both interface levels, he hypothesises that 'there are no PF-LF interactions relevant to convergence. This seems to leave little space for iconicity in this as the performance systems access phonetic and semantic information at non-negotiating autonomous levels of PF and LF. This seems to thoroughly banish iconicity from Chomskyan models of language as under such circumstances only a general theory of performance covering the possible interactions among different performance systems can capture iconic phenomena. This paper attempts to show how iconicity can be incorporated into a generative model of language. It also takes iconicity in language to be an empirical challenge to Chomsky's theory of split interfaces as the model fails to explain the direct correlations between certain A-C interpretations made at the PF interface level and some C-I interpretations at LF.

2 Semantico-Phonetic Form

Let's assume Chomsky's account of the architecture of language as formulated in the Minimalist Program to be true. Now we have two types of tough empirical questions to answer:

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(1) Suppose the derivation D converges at PF but crashes at LF. This means D is expected to crash in the final run. Now how does PF 'understand' that D has crashed at LF, then NOT to be articulated phonetically? How do PF and LF communicate? Are sensori-motor instructions sent to PF temporarily stored somewhere (where?) so that the case of D is decided on at LF, and then PF is informed (how?) to proceed with its articulation of D?

(2) Also suppose that two rival derivations have converged but only one of them, say Da, passes the test of optimality. For example, (1a) below is more economical than (1b) in terms of the DISTANCE/STEPS needed for the Wh-word to move from its cannonical position to [Spec C].

(1)
a. Whom did you persuade t to meet whom?
b. Whom did you persuade whom to meet t?

Da (1a here) must be blocking the less economical but still convergent derivation (1b). How is it signalled to the other interface level to phonetically articulate this single admissible derivation and not the other? How long should PF wait before deciding to articulate a pi (it is too risky to articulate pi even if D has converged at LF as it may simply prove to be less economical than another)? Can one take care of such a mapping between PF and LF without violating the independence assumption of interface levels? Is it the computational system that monitors PF and LF in this respect? Or perhaps all these questions are to be dismissed as the concern of "a full theory of performance" rather than those of the minimalist syntax as a theory of competence (or at best, a less-than-full theory of performance)? Chomskyan accounts of language seem to be silent in these respects.

In agreement with Liberman's (1993) requirement 'that in all communication the processes of production and perception must somehow be linked; their representation must, at some point, be the same' (Place, 2000: par. 40), Lotfi (to appear) proposes a more conservative and conceptually simpler ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS -- THE UNITARIANIST INTERFACE HYPOTHESIS -- according to which at one and the same interface level, say the Semantico-Phonetic Form, the derivation D containing bundles of diverse information types--phonological, formal, and semantic features--is accessible to both C-I and A-P performance systems. Compatible features (phonological features for the A-P system, and formal-semantic features for the other) are processed by each system, which ignores incompatible features, leaving them to the other system to interpret. The derivation crashes if it still contains uninterpreted features when the processing is over. Otherwise, it converges.

Is it possible for one and the same feature to be legible to more than one performance system? Such a thing is out of question in the orthodox minimalist models as a feature is inevitably interpreted by either the A-P or the C-I system. Even if some feature is potentially legible to both, the model leaves no place for its simultaneous interpretation by two performance systems as the feature cannot be present at two autonomous interface levels at the same time. The unitarianist model, on the other hand, readily takes account of such "doubly interpretable" features (or even "multiply interpretable" ones if considering involuntary gestures accompanying speech as the motor interpretation of lexical features) given both its formulation of a single interface level SPF and also the standard minimalist assumption that imperfections in a biological system like language (here, the absence of a perfect one-to-one correspondence between the features to be interpreted and the systems to make interpretations) are just natural. With the A-P and C-I systems accessing information at a single interface level, such features will be inevitably iconic as their phonetic interpretations directly correlate their semantic ones.

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3 The Phonosemantics of Yes/No Questions in Persian

Persian is an SOV language in which unmarked yes/no questions are signalled by both the high-pitched question marker aya at the beginning of a sentence, and the rising intonation with its major pitch movement normally beginning on the final syllable of the verb. In less formal uses of the language, however, aya is usually dropped, which leaves the rising contour as the sole marker of Q. As far as prosody is concerned, pitch plays no phonemic role in Persian. This confines high and low pitches to intonational rises and falls. Stress, on the other hand, is phonemic. Despite that, there is a strong tendency in Persian to put the primary stress on the final syllable of each word.

(2)

[TP HaSAN raft.] (the stressed syllable in bold capitals)

Hasan went

"Hasan went"

[CP Aya [TP HaSAN raft?]] (the stressed syllables in bold capitals)

Q Hasan went

"Did Hasan go?"

[CP f [TP Hasan raft?]]

Hasan went

"Did Hasan go?"

In Chomsky's (2000, 2001) "probe-goal" system, even semantico-pragmatic specifications of human language might happen to be affordable (only) via some formal mechanism in which uninterpretability plays a central role: uninterpretable features of a probe seek the matching features of a local goal (the operation Agree) in order to be erased. For instance, the wh-phrase (the goal) contains an interpretable feature [Q] that agrees with the uninterpretable [Q] feature of the complementiser C (the probe). The goal also contains an uninterpretable [wh] feature that is erased together with the [Q] feature of the probe once the goal has moved to [Spec CP].

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